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INTRODUCTION
In synesthesia, experiences in one domain
evoke additional experiences in another,
as when musical notes or letters of the
alphabet evoke colors. Both the domains
and their pairings are diverse. Indeed,
Day’s (2013) recently tabulated 60 types
of synesthesia, each referring to a differ-
ent combination of inducing and induced
domains. The domains conjoined through
synesthesia may belong to different sense
modalities, as in music-color synesthesia,
but may also belong to the same modal-
ity: In grapheme-color synesthesia, seeing
printed letters or numbers evokes color
experiences.
In music-color and grapheme-color
synesthesia, the inducing stimuli are
perceptual, reflecting culture-specific cat-
egories (notes of the Western musical
scale, letters of the alphabet) learned by
synesthetes and non-synesthetes alike.
Synesthesia may be triggered not only
by sounds, tastes, smells, and pains, but
also by more complex signals: words(e.g.,
Simner, 2007), emotional states (e.g.,
Ward, 2004), and even personalities
(e.g., Novich et al., 2011). Analogously,
the domains of synesthetic responses too
can range widely. The composer Rimsky-
Korsakoff “saw” the key of D-major as
golden (Myers, 1914), while a grapheme-
personification synesthete reported, “Ts
are generally crabbed, ungenerous crea-
tures” (Calkins, 1893; p. 454). Other
phenomena, however, such as cross-
modally evoked images or memories,
are not typically considered examples of
synesthesia.
In this article, we briefly describe half a
dozen illustrative cases that border on tra-
ditional forms of synesthesia: cross-modal
correspondence, cross-modal imagery,
sensory (cross-modal) autobiographical
memory, empathic perception, hallucina-
tion, and the Doppler illusion. Do any or
all of the six constitute forms of synesthe-
sia? The answer depends, we suggest, on
the framework for characterizing synes-
thesia. Consequently, after describing the
six phenomena, we sketch three frame-
works that differ in how they characterize
these phenomena relative to prototypical
forms of synesthesia. Several investigators,
taking different perspectives and coming
to different conclusions, have already con-
sidered possible relations to synesthesia in
three of the six: cross-modal correspon-
dence (Martino and Marks, 2001; Deroy
and Spence, 2013); cross-modal imagery
(Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 2013; Spence
and Deroy, 2013); and empathic percep-
tion (Fitzgibbon et al., 2010; Rothen and
Meier, 2013).
SIX AT THE BORDERS: SYNESTHESIA’S
FAR AND NEAR KIN?
CROSS-MODAL CORRESPONDENCE
Cross-modal correspondences pervade
not only several forms of traditional
synesthesia but also, importantly, the expe-
riences of individuals typically deemed
non-synesthetic (Marks, 1975, 1978;
Spence, 2011). Even non-synesthetes per-
ceive high-pitched vs. low-pitched sounds
to resemble bright vs. dark colors—the
resemblances evident in various tasks of
cross-modal comparison (Marks, 1975;
Ward et al., 2006). Where music-color
synesthetes see brighter colors in high-
pitched notes (e.g., “gold, yellow and
white moving . . . like a rippling stream”:
Mulvenna andWalsh, 2005; p. 399), people
lacking the induced qualia of synesthe-
sia nevertheless recognize cross-modal
similarities.
Cross-modal correspondences often
reflect alignments between bipolar dimen-
sions, such as higher pitch being associated
with greater lightness, greater bright-
ness, higher vertical location, and smaller
size (e.g., Karwoski et al., 1942; Wicker,
1968; Marks, 1974, 1989; Ward et al.,
2006). Several auditory-visual correspon-
dences reveal themselves in young children
(Marks et al., 1987; Mondloch and
Maurer, 2004) and infants (Lewkowicz
and Turkewitz, 1980; Walker et al., 2010;
Haryu and Kajikawa, 2012), as well as in
denizens of disparate cultures: Members
of a remote, semi-nomadic, preliterate
desert-tribe in southern Africa, having vir-
tually no contact with Western culture,
nevertheless overwhelmingly matched
lighter gray colors to higher-pitched
tones—thereby revealing pitch-lightness
correspondence (Mulvenna, 2012).
The tendency for non-synesthetes to
perceive similarities between experiences
in different domains, despite the absence
of secondary qualia, has been called
“synesthetic thinking” (Karwoski et al.,
1942) and “weak synesthesia” (Martino
and Marks, 2001), consistent with the
notion that cross-modal correspondence
reflects general perceptual and cogni-
tive processes. Further, by capitalizing on
cross-modal correspondences, synesthesia
too presumably capitalizes on these gen-
eral processes of perception and cognition
(e.g., Karwoski et al., 1942; Marks, 1978;
Ward et al., 2006).
CROSS-MODAL IMAGERY
Compared to cross-modal correspon-
dence, which can lack induced qualia,
cross-modal imagery is nearer, phe-
nomenologicaly, to prototypical synes-
thesia. In cross-modal imagery, as in
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synesthesia, stimulation in one modal-
ity may arouse mental images in another,
although cross-modal imagery exhibits
greater voluntary control (e.g., Karwoski
and Odbert, 1938). Synesthetic responses
commonly arise automatically, without
requiring effort and being under relatively
little control (e.g., Mattingley et al., 2001).
By comparison, some non-synesthetes
can voluntarily conjure up images, for
example, imagining colors while listen-
ing to music (Karwoski et al., 1942). In
some instances, there may be an espe-
cially intimate connection between visual
imagery and prototypical sound-color
synesthesia. Karwoski and Odbert (1938)
inferred that a small subset of their sub-
jects experienced visual imagery that could
be modulated by music—a phenomenon
that seems more automatic (less volun-
tary) than typical visual imagery, albeit less
automatic (more voluntary) than synes-
thesia. Perhaps music-modulated imagery
bears an especially close connection to
traditional music-color synesthesia.
SENSORY AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
(PROUST PHENOMENON)
Marcel Proust (1922) famously described
the floods of detailed, sensory memories
from childhood evoked by tasting a tea-
soaked madeleine. Sensory, autobiograph-
ical memory of this sort has been dubbed
the “Proust phenomenon” in honor of
the eponymous author. In the Proust phe-
nomenon, odors or flavors in particu-
lar evoke strong sensory-based memories
of associated events experienced in child-
hood (Chu and Downes, 2000). Proustian
memory resembles traditional synesthe-
sia, but also differs from it—resembling
synesthesia in the automatic manner in
which sensory experiences evoke memory
images, but differing in the episodic char-
acter of the memories. In this regard, the
sensory qualia of traditional synesthesia
seem more “semantic” than “episodic.”
EMPATHIC PERCEPTION: PAIN, TOUCH,
COUVADE SYNDROME
In several respects, empathetic per-
ception strongly resembles synesthesia.
In empathic pain, seeing or hearing
evidence of another person’s pain or
discomfort produces analogous pain or
discomfort (e.g., Jackson et al., 2005).
Similarly, seeing another person being
touched may produce an analogous tactile
sensation—often called “mirror touch”
(e.g., Banissy and Ward, 2007). Although
the inducing stimuli come from another
modality—typically, vision or hearing—
the mechanisms underlying empathic
perception presumably rely on an under-
lying within-domain equivalence: where
implicitly-recognized sensations evoke
sensory experiences of the same or similar
kind, perhaps through merging constructs
of “self” and “other.”
Possibly related to empathic pain is the
couvade syndrome, which refers to a set of
empathic symptoms (such as nausea, vom-
iting, and abdominal pain) reported by the
partners of pregnant women. The couvade
syndrome appears to be fairly common,
having a reported prevalence of about
22% (Lipkin and Lamb, 1982), roughly
five times that of traditional synesthesia
(Simner et al., 2006).
A feature that distinguishes empathic
perception from traditional forms of
synesthesia is the very characteristic that
makes empathy empathic—the intrin-
sic equivalence between the emotional
qualities of the inducing and induced
experiences. In traditional forms of synes-
thesia, however, as when sound evokes
visual color or shape, the inducing and
induced sensations not only reflect differ-
ent domains but are also usually related
more abstractly, even “metaphorically”
(Rothen and Meier, 2013).
HALLUCINATION
A hallucination is a “percept-like expe-
rience which (a) occurs in the absence
of appropriate stimulus, (b) has the full
force or impact of the corresponding
(real) perception, and (c) is not amenable
to direct and voluntary control by the
experiencer” (Slade and Bentall, 1988;
p. 23). Several of these attributes also char-
acterize synesthesia. Hallucinations may
involve any of the senses (Ohayon, 2000)
and are easily distinguished as “percep-
tions not confirmed by others” (Ohayon,
2000; p. 154). Some types of halluci-
nations, though not all, may fall near
the borders of synesthesia. Thus, synes-
thetic experiences commonly include col-
ors and shapes (Day, 2013). Analogously,
“simple hallucinations,” often triggered by
migraines or hallucinogens (Ermentrout
and Cowan, 1979), commonly include
simple recurring shapes and patterns, or
‘form constants (Klüver, 1966), which
apparently reflect patterns of neural acti-
vation in visual cortex (Ermentrout and
Cowan, 1979).
No longer considered explicitly patho-
logical, hallucinations are now generally
treated as independent perceptual phe-
nomena (Romme and Escher, 1989; see
Strauss, 1969). Auditory verbal hallucina-
tions (hearing voices), for instance, occur
in about 13% of adults in the general
population (Beavan et al., 2011), and
their presence does not correlate signifi-
cantly with psychopathology (Johns et al.,
2002; Sommer et al., 2010). Although the
strongest predictor of psychopathology in
hallucinations is distress over their con-
tent or possible basis (Romme and Escher,
1989; Chadwick and Birchwood, 1994;
Beavan et al., 2011), distress is rarely asso-
ciated with synesthetic experience.
THE DOPPLER ILLUSION
Day’s (2013) table listing 60 types of
synesthesia includes only one type that is
explicitly intra-modal, namely, grapheme-
color synesthesia. We note here another
phenomenon in which sensory experi-
ences in one domain induce experiences
in the same modality, the “Doppler illu-
sion,” reported by Neuhoff and McBeath
(1996): When a tone increases continu-
ously in intensity over time (as though
a sound-emitting source were approach-
ing at constant velocity) but maintains a
constant sound frequency, observers nev-
ertheless report hearing the tone’s pitch
to increase as loudness increases. Neuhoff
and McBeath dubbed the illusory increase
in pitch the “Doppler illusion” because
a sound source approaching at constant
velocity will produce, at the observer’s
location, an elevated, albeit constant,
sound frequency (the physical Doppler
effect). But might we not also call the
Doppler illusion a case of intra-modal
(loudness-pitch) synesthesia?
SYNESTHESIA: CONTINUOUS,
DISCRETE, PLURALISTIC?
If, as the term implies, synesthesia is first
and foremost a “conjoining of experi-
ences,” then one might construe several
or perhaps all six of our cases as exam-
ples of synesthesia. If, on the other hand,
synesthesia is defined more narrowly, for
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example, by requiring it to include qualia
and to arise automatically and consis-
tently, then fewer cases would make the
cut. Recently, the first author outlined
three theoretical frameworks—monism,
dualism, and pluralism—that, in differ-
ent ways, characterize how synesthesia
could relate to borderline perceptual and
conceptual phenomena like the six just
described (Marks, 2011, 2012).
Synestheticmonism refers to the notion
that synesthesia may appropriately be con-
sidered a spectrum or continuum. Using
this framework, traditional forms of synes-
thesia, such as music-color and grapheme-
color, serve as prototypes, residing at the
high end of the continuum, with weaker
forms, such as cross-modal correspon-
dence, residing toward the low end. In
the present examples, music-modulated
imagery, hallucinations, empathic percep-
tions, Proustian evoked memories, and
the Doppler illusion might lie at vari-
ous loci between the ends of the synes-
thetic spectrum—although the differences
amongst them suggest that the hypothe-
sized spectrum is multidimensional.
The other two frameworks both dis-
tinguish sharply between synesthesia
and non-synesthetic forms of percep-
tion and conception. Dualism posits a
simple dichotomy between the two cat-
egories, with synesthesia incorporating
both traditional forms (e.g., sound-
color, grapheme-color, word-flavor,
taste-shape) and others (e.g., grapheme-
personification, ordinal sequence-spatial
sequence), and non-synesthesia incor-
porating cross-modal correspondence,
cross-modal imagery, and hallucina-
tion. How to categorize other borderline
examples, such as empathic perception,
Proustian memory, and the Doppler
illusion, however, is less clear.
Like dualism, the third framework,
pluralism, explicitly distinguishes synes-
thetic from non-synesthetic experiences,
but rests on the additional assumption that
synesthesia is well characterized as (appro-
priating James’s, 1890; p. 224, expression)
“a teeming multiplicity.” Like monism,
synesthetic pluralism recognizes that some
forms of synesthesia, such as music-color,
are better exemplars than are others, such
as empathic perception and the Doppler
illusion. In the pluralistic view, however,
the broad category of synesthesia itself
contains a cornucopia of distinct sub-
categories, lacking common denomina-
tors but perhaps linked one to another
along the lines suggested by Wittgenstein’s
(1953) notion of family resemblance.
Critical, in our view, to choosing
amongst frameworks is characterizing
the role of phenomenal experience in
defining synesthesia; many investiga-
tors judge this role to be significant
(see, e.g., the exchange among Cohen
Kadosh and Terhune, 2012; Eagleman,
2012; Simner, 2012a,b). Monism in par-
ticular relies substantially on the notion
that phenomenal experience plays a
central, and ineluctable, role in char-
acterizing synesthesia. Alternatively,
jettisoning phenomenology may be con-
ducive to pluralistic frameworks that
rely on mechanism-based distinctions
amongst multiple forms of synesthe-
sia. And jettisoning phenomenology
may be especially conducive to dualistic
frameworks that rely on a mechanism-
based distinction between synesthesia
and borderline phenomena—perhaps
akin to distinguishing mechanistically
between rhinovirus-induced sniffles and
pollen-induced seasonal nasal allergies.
But we ask, Are phenomenal experi-
ences (qualia) analogous to sneezes?
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